The transfer of Jodhpur railways, 1947-48: Denials, delays and divisions by Rakesh Ankit (5005661)
 SPECIAL ARTICLE
OCTOBER 7, 2017 vol liI no 40  EPW  Economic & Political Weekly40
The Transfer of Jodhpur Railways, 1947–48
Denials, Delays and Divisions
Rakesh Ankit
The author is grateful to Ronil Chaudhuri for providing the inspiration, 
occasion and space to write this article. Special thanks to Abhishek 
Dimri for indulging a hearing of the piece and his suggestion on its title.
Rakesh Ankit (rankit@jgu.edu.in) is with OP Jindal Global University, 
Sonipat, Haryana.
The process of partition between India and Pakistan, 
that is, dividing up material assets, remains an 
under-written subject, barring its border-building 
aspects. While the old scholarship offered an adversarial 
account of this exercise, the recent attempts revise this 
narrative by stressing upon the cooperation evinced by 
the two sides. Where the former found antagonism, the 
latter has sought to locate some mutually agreed 
method in the madness. Focusing on Jodhpur, a 
princely state, which has not found a place in this matrix, 
this paper brings together a slice of history from the 
integration of the princely states with the history of 
partition, a connection not usually made. Delineating a 
facet of early interdominion relations on the division of 
asset of a princely state, it questions the “two peas 
in a pod” seeking-consensus approach to early 
India–Pakistan relations that puts two unequal entities 
together on an equal plane.  
Seventy years on, the shadow of partition of British India remains “long” and “great” with its “deadly legacy” in perpetual “fl ux” (Zamindar 2007; Khan 2007; Gould 
et al 2013; Hajari 2015). From history-writing in academe 
(Pandey 2001), to public politicking (Singh 2010), to increas-
ing documentation1 and memorialising,2 the “savage” crop of 
1947 is literally being harvested around us all the time (Sarna 
2013). While the “high politics” leading up to that cataclysmic 
event was the fl avour for the longest time (Moore 1983; Jalal 
1985; Roy 1990; Chatterji 1994), the historical fl air has since 
shifted to counting its considerable divisions, dissonances and 
spoils (Hasan 1997; Sikand 2004; Talbot 2006, 2011; Chatterji 
2007); in other words, from the eclipse of empire and making 
the new commonwealth (Moore 1987; Low 1991) to borders 
and boundaries (Menon and Bhasin 1998), refugees and citi-
zens (Jayal 2013) and the making of “partitioned lives” in “ex-
ile” from their “homelands” in postcolonial India and  Pakistan 
(Chakraborty et al 2007; Nair 2011; Roy 2012;  Bhavnani 2014). 
A vital, perhaps the fundamental, aspect of partition was 
the division of assets of British India between its succeeding 
dominions. From pins to planes and typewriters to trains, the 
Partition Council and its subcommittees distributed these in 
varying permutations and combinations. The emerging schol-
arship on this carving up of material by men, thin as it is 
 (Samaddar 1999; Yong and Kudaisya 2000, 2007), can be 
grouped into two schools of thought: one asserting the adver-
sarial and contentious nature of this exercise (McLeod 2008), 
while the other, more recent attempt(s), countering the prag-
matic cooperation evinced by the two sides and, thus, compli-
cating the confl ictual process (Sengupta 2014; Raghavan 2016). 
While the former has found antagonism in ideological and 
theological foundations manifesting “in a confl ict of self and 
other with both states questioning the legitimacy of the other,” 
the latter has probed if in “the actual process of dividing the 
country, there was some method in the madness” and has 
found “cooperation, mutual trust, order, an air of certainty 
and decisions through discussions and deliberations.”    
Following these trends, but focusing on a region, a princely 
state, which has not found a place in these, this paper brings 
together a slice of history from the integration of the princely 
states with the history of partition; a link not often established. 
Concerned with the old Marwar capital of Jodhpur from the 
Rajputana region (currently the Indian state of Rajasthan) and 
viewing an episode of its interaction with the governments of 
Pakistan and India, it examines the myriad ways and multiple 
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levels through which the sentiments of partition affected the 
subcontinent. At the heart of that episode was the fate of the 
Jodhpur railway and this paper, by tracing it, throws yet more 
light on the nature of the early postcolonial state in India and 
Pakistan. In doing so, it fi rst questions the narrative of a 
Nehruvian elite consensus in the former, and second, compli-
cates the understanding of a consolidated colonial “offi cial 
mind.” Third, given that the crux of the matter was the ques-
tion of ownership of a railway line, this also refl ects upon its 
impact on the movement of refugees. Here, it contrasts the le-
gal position of the problem, emphasised by some, with the hu-
man app roach to it taken by others. 
Thus, delineating another facet of the deterioration of early 
interdominion relations on a rather small issue made signifi -
cant, this paper wonders whether the new alternative history 
of India–Pakistan relations (Chatterji 2012) stressing cooper-
ation and coexistence puts two unequal entities together on 
an equal plane. This “two peas in a pod” approach that sees 
both needing each other to assert distinction so as to function 
as viable entities against each other “risks pharisaism, given 
their respective starting-points, not to speak of the responsi-
bility of the stronger in doing its best to sabotage the weaker 
from the outset” (Anderson 2013: 145). Highlighting the hap-
penings in Jodhpur through 1947–48, this study shows that, 
contrary to this recent revisionism in the literature, it was in-
deed the “policy of paramountcy of self-preservation” (Ra-
ghavan 2012: 15) that held sway in the ultimate analysis and 
action—notwithstanding the intention—between the domin-
ions and princely states. There was certainly “negotiation and 
exchange,” but it was between two sides, two governments 
that were just not starting from the same point. 
While Pakistan emerged in August 1947, India inherited the 
“successor status to the Raj, its seat at the UN, control of the 
capital, three-quarters of the territory and population of Bri-
tish India, 14/20 armoured regiments, 40/48 artillery regi-
ments, 21/29 infantry regiments, larger part of the air force 
and navy and 137,000/160,000 tonnes of ordinance” (Cohen 
1984: 7; Talbot 1998: 99; Anderson 2013: 67). 
Even if one underplays the religious emotionalism, nation-
alist irrationalism and a predisposition towards vengeful 
 confl ict, as urged by the revisionist scholarship, how can one 
write about a “mutual aim,” when the meaning of “closure to the 
process of partition” was not reciprocal (Raghavan 2012: 10–11)? 
Nothing encapsulates the evasive and contradictory character 
of the revisionist take better than the following  quotation:
Whether it was the case of a territorial dispute or property or people, 
the approach that both governments took in forming their bilateral 
positions were very consistent. What both the governments agreed to 
do was to conduct relations on an edgy precipice, where the possibi-
lity of compromises of various kinds was always present and tangible. 
(Raghavan 2012: 19)      
In fact, as this study shows, little remained “uncertain, tenuous, 
fragmented and fl exible” in the early interdominion and prin-
cely states’ approach towards each other (Raghavan 2012: 15), 
which progressively hardened. Restricting itself to the  issue of 
movement of minorities, on which this particular episode—
gleaned from File No 27 (40)/48 of the Prime Minister’s secre-
tariat branch of the Government of India collection in the 
 National Archives of India (New Delhi), and the Subject File 
Serial No 35 of the V Instalment of the Sri Prakasa Papers in 
the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (New Delhi)— 
directly impinged, one fi nds a confi dent, substantial, total and 
rigid way in which Jodhpur, New Delhi, and, to the extent it 
could, Karachi behaved during “partitioned times” (Deschaumes 
and Ivekovic 2003). 
A Nehruvian Elite Consensus 
In June 1948, one year from the partition plan of British India, 
the metre gauge railway in the now Pakistani province of 
Sind was still being managed by the Jodhpur government. 
This had been the case since 1924, following an agreement 
 between the then secretary of state and Jodhpur princely 
state. All rolling stock, machinery, plant and stores, whether 
required for the Jodhpur section or the Sind section were pro-
vided by the Jodhpur government. In the Partition Council 
(July–August 1947), it was decided to terminate this arrange-
ment, anomalous after Sind went to Pakistan and Jodhpur 
 acceded to India, and the responsibility for working this 
railway line was to pass on to the Pakistan government latest 
by 31 July 1948. 
The 1924 agreement had made a provision for a separation 
of the two sections. The then secretary of state had agreed to 
take over “on payment” a share of the rolling stock, machin-
ery, plant and stores. Herein, lay the nub of the dispute: did 
“on payment” mean “prepayment” as insisted by Jodhpur rail-
way authorities, from March to November 1948, the duration 
of the dispute? Or, as exp ressed by the Pakistani offi cials, was 
this insistence for “pre-payment” by the Jodhpur government 
at variance with the  established practice, while carrying the 
likelihood of mutual suspicion and argument? 
Interestingly, it was Karachi that asked for the Government 
of India’s intervention in this tussle and not Jodhpur. If any-
thing, the latter was rather reluctant for New Delhi to be in-
volved. In the summer of 1948, Sir Muhammad Zafarullah 
Khan, Pakistan’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, complained to 
then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, “that the Gov-
ernment of Jodhpur is creating a dead-lock in regard to the 
transfer of Pakistan section of Jodhpur railway.” Vehemently 
denying this charge, Jai Narain Vyas, Jodhpur’s premier, 
claimed to Nehru in a demi-offi cial letter written on 21 June 
1948 (No 186/S) that “both the Government of Pakistan and 
the Jodhpur Government had agreed that the Pakistan Gov-
ernment should make an advance payment for the stock they 
take.” Asserting that Pakistan had gone back on its word, 
Vyas added that “it is they who did not like the idea and the 
transfer of this section was postponed from the 1 June to the 
31 July, 1948.” Giving into hosting a conference of the repre-
sentatives of the governments of Pakistan, Jodhpur and India 
in early-July 1948, Vyas asked Nehru for “a gist of what has 
passed  between Sir Zafarullah and yourself.” 
The said meeting was held at Jodhpur on 1 and 2 July 1948 and 
was presided over by I S Puri, the then fi nancial commissioner 
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of the Indian Railways. No agreement, however, could be 
reached as regards the time of payment by Pakistan govern-
ment of the value of rolling stock, plant, machinery and stores, 
which were to be transferred from Jodhpur. Pakistan repre-
sentatives offered to pay 90% of the value on 1 August 1948 
after the stock had been handed over, while Jodhpur repre-
sentatives insisted on the amount being deposited before 16 
July 1948 with the Reserve Bank of India, as an “irrevocable 
credit” in favour of Jodhpur, they also wanted to be able to 
make withdrawals from this deposit. The total value of the as-
sets in question was estimated at `56 lakh. There was no 
agreement reached at on the question of acceptance by Paki-
stan of their  liability for the proportionate share of gratuity 
and leave  salary of the staff or for their share of compensation 
claims arising out of traffi c carried before the separation, but 
to be paid after the 31 July 1948. Further, Indian Railways 
wanted Pakistan Railways to accept the liability for the arrears 
due to the revision of pay scales with retrospective effect from 
1 January 1947. 
Sri Prakasa Papers
This may have been the view of the matter from Jodhpur, but 
to Sri Prakasa, India’s fi rst high commissioner to Pakistan, 
from his vantage point in Karachi, this problem appeared in 
a different light. He had been dealing with it cursorily since 
 October 1947 and more actively since February 1948 “in view 
of serious consequences to innocent public.” Having dis-
covered early the “mutual suspicion between Pakistan and 
Jodhpur,” Sri Prakasa pointed it out to Nehru in a long letter 
of 16 August 1948 that, fi rst of all, Jodhpur had stopped the 
transfer of net earnings of the Sind section to Pakistan since 
August 1947. Payments were regularly made till July 1947, 
 after which they were suddenly stopped. Since end-February 
1948, Sri Prakasa had made many representations on this 
matter to the Ministry of External Affairs and Common-
wealth Relations (MEA&CR), but these went unheeded. The 
ministry regarded this “as a  totally separate transaction to be 
settled independently.” Neither Pakistan nor Sri Prakasa 
could see the “justifi cation” of this stand as they suggested 
for “outstanding payments from either party to be put into a 
consolidated account.” 
It was only towards July 1948, the stipulated date for the 
transfer of railways from Jodhpur to Pakistan that “the prob-
lem arose of transfer of rolling stock by Jodhpur and payment 
for the same by Pakistan.” Jodhpur had interpreted the 1924 
agreement to mean that payment will be made before the 
transfer of rolling stock while Pakistan said they would pay 
after receipt of rolling stocks. The relevant words of Clause 
16(a) of the agreement were: “In the event of separation of the 
working of the British (that is Sind) section, the Secretary of 
State (now Government of  Pakistan) agrees to take over on 
payment of the proportionate book value.” While the legal of-
fi cers in New Delhi were inclined to uphold Jodhpur’s inter-
pretation, Sri Prakasa sensibly said that “in ordinary transac-
tions, very often goods are delivered [fi rst] … stringent inter-
pretations are seldom sought after,” and wistfully wondered 
“if the draftsmen of the original agreement had any idea of 
such diffi culties ever arising between the Secretary of State 
and the Jodhpur Darbar.” In the climate vitiated by the vicissi-
tudes of partition, “mutual suspicions had taken strong root, 
Jodhpur refused to part with rolling stock before Pakistan 
paid up, while Pakistan wanted the rolling stock before pay-
ing.” Moreover, to Sri Prakasa it seemed that Pakistan had a 
“legitimate reason for suspicion because [of] their net earn-
ings being withheld since August 1947, which roughly 
amounted to over [`]2 lakh per month.”
Away from all this, on the ground and along the railway line 
between Jodhpur and Sind, charges and countercharges start-
ed to fl ow. Pakistan claimed Jodhpur was sabotaging the 
whole railway by depriving it of stores, weighing machines, 
turntables, etc, while Jodhpur charged Pakistan with taking 
illegal possession of rolling stock and tampering with controls, 
etc. Matters came to a head when Jodhpur cancelled the 
9 Up-Sind Mail train between Luni (Jodhpur) and Hyderabad 
(Sind) on 26 July 1948, without any prior information on the 
plea, as was later claimed in a summary prepared by the rail-
way ministry on 5 October 1948 that there were only fi ve–six 
passengers travelling on it. 
Pakistan cancelled the corresponding 10 Down mail train as 
also the refugee train claiming that Jodhpur’s action was with 
the intention to deprive the Sind section of that promised rail-
way stock and fearing that if they allowed trains to go to Jodh-
pur, “these also would be freezed.” Thus, on 15 August 1948, 
the only train link between Pakistan and India in the Rajpu-
tana–Sind sector had been cut off for three weeks, with hun-
dreds of refugees stranded on both sides. 
Sri Prakasa’s “deep concern” did not end here though. In 
view of so many unresolved differences, he had suggested 
that these be referred to arbitration, but was surprised when 
Karachi opted to favour “settlement by mutual consultation.” 
Sri Prakasa had also visited Jodhpur in the last week of July 
to fi nd that the Imperial Bank at Jodhpur had received an 
advice from the Imperial Bank, Karachi that a sum of `50 
lakh had been deposited by the Pakistan government in the 
Karachi branch “in connection with the purchase of the 
 British section of the Jodhpur Railway.” Vyas and Puri, how-
ever, had disappointed him by refusing to interpret this ges-
ture as one of goodwill, let alone that of payment to Jodhpur 
as “the conditions of payment [were only to] be advised later.” 
Not just that, the Jodhpur authorities hid from Sri Prakasa 
that they had stopped the Sind Mail fi rst, complaining 
 instead that Pakistan had stopped all trains; as Sri Prakasa 
had felt, Jodhpur and Pakistan “both feared” that the other 
will freeze the train t raffi c and thus proceeded to pre-empt 
the other. By 30 July 1948, as the above-mentioned railway 
ministry summary recounted, both sides “had taken forcible 
possession of the Control Offi ce[s] and cut off connection 
through control wires.” The Pakistan government now 
 demanded their share of net earnings of the Sind section 
stopped since August 1947, while Jodhpur government 
 demanded the ability to  withdraw unconditionally from the 
money deposited in the Imperial Bank.
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Understanding a Colonial ‘Official Mind’
As August 1948 approached and the two dominions started 
preparations for their fi rst Independence Day celebrations, the 
position of this case was that now New Delhi had taken the 
lead, and the detaining of the train by Pakistan had become 
the bigger bone of contention. The Ministry of Railways de-
manded that before the transfer of any rolling stock from 
Jodhpur, Karachi must make “immediate payment of `16 lakh 
representing  value of rolling stock detained by them.” If the 
latter desired to have the rest of the rolling stock, under the 
1924 agreement, “they must make pre-payment.” Only after 
this was done, New Delhi could commit the delivery of stock 
from Jodhpur to  Hyderabad (Sind). Unmoved by the plight of 
refugees, New Delhi offered a population exchange/transfer 
at the border: “the only way of refugees being moved by rail 
from Sind to  India and vice versa was for both Jodhpur and 
Pakistan trains being brought to the border and Hindu refu-
gees being transhipped into Jodhpur trains and Muslim refu-
gees being transhipped into Pakistan trains.” Faced with this 
intransigence, Karachi was the fi rst to blink. In a telegram 
dated 4 August 1948 (S No 48), Sri Prakasa reported that Paki-
stan government had instructed the Imperial Bank to release 
`10 lakh “immediately to the Jodhpur Railway for stock held 
here [Sind].” In  return, they sought Jodhpur “to release valua-
tion papers for rolling stock detained [there], which were pre-
pared by Pakistan and Jodhpur offi cers working jointly at 
Jodhpur.” Regarding the resumption of railway services, given 
that its present stock scarcely suffi ced for Pakistan’s internal 
services, Karachi desired for the “timetable to be so arranged 
that one train from that side and one train from this side should 
cross near the border, so that each Dominion will have one 
rake of the other in its possession as guarantee of good faith.” 
Next day, Jodhpur authorities confi rmed that `10 lakh was 
credited on the afternoon of 5 August (S No 52), but pointed 
out that the value of stock detained by the Pakistan govern-
ment was about `17 lakh. Five days later, on 10 August (S No 
55) Sri Prakasa again reported Pakistan’s “undertaking that if 
Jodhpur runs a special up to border of Sind with Muslim refu-
gees … the same train could carry Hindu refugees back to 
Jodhpur.” Next day, Pakistan authorities told him that the `10 
lakh paid was approximately the price of the rolling stock in 
their possession and promised the remaining payment on  receipt 
of rolling stock, as Sri Prakasa informed New Delhi on 11 Au-
gust (S No 56). None of this was enough for the railway au-
thorities in New Delhi. They asserted that the `10 lakh paid 
did not cover the value of the stock detained, which was over 
`17 lakh, and the remaining `7 lakh should fi rst be paid for. 
With respect to the overall stock transfer, they bluntly directed 
Sri Prakasa on 14 August (S No 57) that “prepayment was an 
essential condition for delivery ... no stock will cross the border 
which had not been paid for.” Regarding refugee trains, the 
ministry’s reply was remarkable in its calculativeness: 
We understand that the number of Hindu refugees at Hyderabad is far 
in excess of capacity of one train, whereas Muslim refugees in Jodh-
pur not many. If [Pakistan’s] undertaking means that [they] will run 
 refugee specials to the border only till Muslim refugees have been 
evacuated from Jodhpur, it falls far short of requirements. Govern-
ment of India propose that Pakistan should run specials to the bor-
der till all Hindu refugees at Hyderabad and between Hyderabad 
and Khokhropar have been cleared. Jodhpur should run specials to 
the border and the Hindu refugees brought there in Pakistan specials 
should be transhipped. Jodhpur specials will carry Muslim refugees 
to the border so long as there are any; otherwise will run empty to 
that place.
This attitude was in stark contrast to the one evinced by Sri 
Prakasa. In his response, dated 16 August (S No 64), he began 
from the beginning and reminded New Delhi that the main 
point of difference was that “Jodhpur interpreted original 
agreement to mean that payment will be made before transfer 
of rolling stock while Pakistan said they would pay after re-
ceipt of rolling stock.” Remarking that “in situation as it is 
some half way house can alone meet diffi culty,” refl ecting that 
“mutual distrust is so great that neither we accept their guar-
antee nor they accept our guarantee,” ruminating that “some-
one must show the way and I wish our government could do 
that when Pakistan does not,” Sri Prakasa reaffi rmed that 
“Jodhpur need have no fears because Pakistan has placed `50 
lakh in the Imperial Bank of India, Jodhpur, to the extent of 
`40 lakh over `10 lakh already transferred.” He also revealed 
that though the value of the stock detained by Pakistan may 
have been more than `10 lakh, as claimed by Indian Railways, 
he had agreed to this sum “in order that the vicious circle may 
be broken and confi dence restored.” 
Writing again four days later, on 20 August (S No 66), Sri 
Prakasa let New Delhi know that Karachi was “very bitter for 
having made the payment of `10 lakh” for basically nothing in 
return. But, given their straitened circumstances, Pakistan au-
thorities were even “willing to go to Jodhpur and pay on the 
nail as stock was delivered and earnestly suggested simultane-
ous handling of stock and payment.” Sri Prakasa ended by 
pointing out once again that “any proposal for prepayment or, 
for that matter pre-delivery, was impracticable now.” In the 
face of such an impassioned plea by their own representative 
in Karachi, the Government of India, in this case the Ministry 
of Railways and the ministry without portfolio assisting with 
refugees and rehabilitation, met, discussed and incredibly 
hardened their position. Their telegram to Sri Prakasa of 24 
August (S No 67) elaborated that
Pakistan should place an irrevocable credit of ` 40 lakh in the branch of 
the Imperial Bank of Jodhpur … cheques should be issued for the book 
value of the rolling stock handed over by Jodhpur to Pakistan … fi rst 
charge on the irrevocable credit should be the difference between the 
book value of stock [held by Pakistan] and the sum of ` 10 lakh already 
paid by Pakistan … There was no objection to [Pakistan authorities] 
proceeding to Jodhpur and paying on the nail for stock to be delivered 
thereafter if Pakistan should prefer this solution.
Even more remarkable is the feeling entertained by them 
that “these proposals were made mainly with a view to satisfy 
our high-commissioner, who felt that he had made certain com-
mitments and his honour would be involved if the stand taken 
by us was not modifi ed to some extent.” To Sri Prakasa, these 
proposals appeared as far from doing anything of this sort. A 
close friend of Nehru since the late 1910s, an anguished and 
hurt high commissioner now decided to write directly to the 
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Prime Minister. On 16 August 1948, he sent two letters to 
Nehru: one, an offi cial account that was copied to Nehru’s 
 infl uential private secretary M O Mathai as well as the addi-
tional secretary (commonwealth relations) Subimal Dutt, the 
other, “strictly personal and confi dential,” for Nehru only. 
Sri Prakasa began by giving voice to his fear that his “inter-
vention lately (has become) unwelcome, for, to my regret, I 
could not see eye to eye with our offi cers and advised them on 
many points in a manner which they did not approve.” Then, 
he informed Nehru that, “when matters came to a head and a 
deadlock,” he had insisted upon the communications ministry 
of Pakistan, “on the distinct instructions of Mr I S Puri that at 
least payment should be made for the amount of stock in pos-
session of Pakistan.” On the lookout for a reciprocal confi dence-
building measure, Sri Prakasa had proceeded to give the Paki-
stan authorities “guarantees on behalf of Government of India 
that they would get their stock if they started paying on 
strength of Puri’s telegram.” It was this that had led to Karachi 
placing ` 10 lakh in the Imperial Bank, as the Pakistan authori-
ties made a rough calculation of the value of stock in their pos-
session, which they thought was one-fi fth of the total stock 
due and so, “to satisfy” Sri Prakasa, they had paid “1/5th of the 
total value of `50 lakh, that is, `10 lakh” to the Imperial Bank 
for transfer to Jodhpur Railways.
Elaborating upon this rough calculation, Sri Prakasa wrote 
that Karachi already held four big engines and two shunting 
engines, 30 big passenger bogeys and 14 smaller bogeys and 
200 goods wagons, while the total rolling stock that should 
come to them, as agreed under the 1924 agreement, consisted 
of 28 engines, 166 passenger bogeys and 773 goods wagons. 
Recounting Pakistan’s further proposal that they would in-
struct Imperial Bank “to go on paying as they got more stock,” 
Sri Prakasa regretted that the mandarins in the Ministry of 
Railways in New Delhi “show continuing distrust but suggests 
no other method except complete payment.” He reminded 
Nehru that “suspicion exists on both sides and blame also at-
taches to both. As we say in Hindi we cannot clap with one 
hand.” And, it was not as if “generous gesture on our part will 
mean fi nancial risk,” as Jodhpur Railways had over ` 20 lakh as 
net earnings from 1947, from which it had anyway not released 
Sind’s share to Pakistan. Instead, it “may save situation.” Urg-
ing Nehru, Mathai and Dutt for a “considered reply,” Sri Prakasa 
acknowledged that “the matter is fi nally for Government of 
India to decide [and] I shall do exactly as they instruct,” but he 
could not help feeling that he could “put this matter right if 
entrusted with the task and if Jodhpur railway [is] advised to 
cooperate with me fully. This conviction makes me particular-
ly sad at [the] growing deteriorating situation.” 
In his “strictly personal and confi dential” note to Nehru, Sri 
Prakasa stuck to his twin themes of “trust begets trust” and 
“personal consideration.” He had “hoped every payment of 
theirs would bring more stock, for which further payments 
will go on being made.” He now felt mistaken, embarrassed 
and almost humiliated as the Ministry of Railways said that 
“no stock can be given before full advance payment is made.” 
Blaming himself for “a manner, which apparently was 
 unwarranted though to me looked straight, honest and practi-
cal,” Sri Prakasa offered to resign. 
In these circumstances, I feel that it may not be right for me to contin-
ue in this offi ce as the persons concerned in the Pakistan Government 
are feeling—and they are making no secret of it—that I let them down 
and got this payment made without any idea of fulfi lling the rest of the 
bargain. They obviously feel that we do not propose to give them any 
rolling stock and propose to keep all the net earnings of the whole year 
and the `10 lakh that they have now transferred. Even if they may not 
feel so, they can have no doubt that we do not propose to give them 
any rolling stock and would stop their railway. I fear I can be regarded 
as a party to these suspicions and I certainly do not feel that I enjoy 
[the] confi dence of our ministry concerned in carrying on these nego-
tiations properly … There need be no embarrassment to you for you 
know I am not anxious to continue … This however becomes a matter 
of honour and I depend upon you to help me to maintain it.
 Taking a liberty that only old and close personal equations 
allow, Sri Prakasa concluded by advising Nehru to 
order [return] by Jodhpur Government of  `10 lakh already paid [by 
Pakistan] if government feels [that] they must have whole or noth-
ing. Then mutual negotiations, if any, can [then] start afresh on status 
quo ante.
 He was sorrowful, for “despite the best of intentions and 
closest of thoughts,” he now realised that “state matters can-
not go by good intentions [but] only by good results.”
Question of Ownership of the Railway Line
Two days after Mohammad Ali Jinnah passed away on 11 Sep-
tember 1948, Sri Prakasa learnt that Pakistan government 
“was prepared to put ` 40 lakh to [Jodhpur’s] irrevocable credit 
but [was] adamant that the difference between the book value 
of stock already taken over [`17 lakh] and the sum of `10 lakh 
already paid should be the last and not fi rst charge against this 
credit” and accordingly informed New Delhi. If this seemed 
like the makings of a breakthrough, hopes were sniffed out 
soon as the Ministry of Railways continued to insist that “`7 
lakh being the difference between the value of the stock already 
with Pakistan and `10 lakh should be the fi rst charge against 
the irrevocable credit.” When this reached him, Sri Prakasa 
once again put up resistance and got minor modifi cations. 
The Ministry of Railways wrote to the high commissioner 
on 29 September 1948 (S No 77) that it had decided that in-
stead of insisting on making an immediate payment of ` 7 lakh, 
“to break the deadlock more material of substantial value will 
be arranged to be supplied to the Pakistan Government, who 
should agree to pay the value of the material so supplied plus 
the balance which is still due from them as the fi rst release 
from the irrevocable credit.” The Ministry of Railways felt that 
this was “as far as [it could go] in meeting the wishes of the 
Pakistan Government for honouring the commitments which 
[Sri Prakasa] had made to them.” And, this feeling was accom-
panied by a complaint, namely, that their desire that “Pakistan 
should run enough refugee trains to enable all Hindu refugees 
in returning to India” had not been met with favour. Not realis-
ing that the boot on this matter was actually on the other foot 
the Ministry of Railways hoped that this gesture leading to 
“the agreement practically reached regarding rolling stock 
will evoke now a favourable attitude from Pakistan.” 
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What they got instead was a missive from their own Prime 
Minister. Twelve months from when the said fi le had embarked 
upon its three-way journey between Jodhpur, Karachi and 
New Delhi, the continuing impasse fi nally evoked a response 
from Nehru. On 3 October 1948 (PM 1386), he wrote at length 
to the new Railways Minister N G Ayyangar as well as Refu-
gees and Rehabilitation Minister M L Saksena. In his charac-
teristic tone, Nehru began by mentioning that he “was trou-
bled about the Jodhpur Railway Affair.” He was leaving for the 
United Nations (UN) session at Paris in two days’ time but had 
called a conference on the matter before that as, “otherwise I 
shall have little peace of mind.” While he admitted that he did 
“not know of the intricate details,” having read the intergovern-
mental correspondence and having discussed the matter with 
various people since Sri Prakasa’s personal note to him in August, 
there had been “a growing feeling in [him] that we have been 
mismanaging this, indeed that we have not acted quite straight 
about it.” And, then he made an amazing admission: 
On several occasions I expressed my earnest desire that the matter 
should be settled, but nothing came of it. Where the obstruction lay, 
I could not quite make out, whether in the Ministry of Refugee and 
Rehabilitation or in the Railway Ministry, or in Jodhpur. I have a pow-
erful sensation that no serious attempt has been made on our part to 
come to a settlement and that probably no settlement was desired.
This was “bad enough” then for the Indian Prime Minister and 
reads poorly now, all these years later. But, what was “really 
painful” to him was “the complete ignoring of the human factor.”
Large numbers of our people are stranded in Sind and are suffering 
great hardships because the railway line has ceased to work. Consid-
erable numbers have tried to walk the seven miles gap through very 
inhospitable country, infested by robbers and dacoits. They have been 
looted and deprived of their goods, their women have been raped, and 
they lie in crowds at small wayside stations where even water is lack-
ing. The amount of misery caused has been tremendous. I wonder if 
people sitting in our offi ces drafting telegrams or letters pay heed to 
this human element and misery.
Lest he be misunderstood, he made it clear that “if some 
high principle was involved or some great advantage to our 
country, we have to put up with suffering,” but he was unable 
to see either “principle or advantage in this business.” All that 
he saw was “an extremely narrow-minded approach … almost 
inhuman and sometimes … even worse than that, in fact that 
it has not been quite straight and above board.” As for the legal 
eagles, he knew that “all this might be justifi ed by some legal-
istic interpretation,” but for him that was “not good enough.” 
And, then, his old friend Sri Prakasa had “felt very strongly on 
this issue and even offered his resignation.” Once again, to 
Nehru, it was “immaterial” whether Sri Prakasa was “right or 
wrong,” but the fact that India’s representative in Pakistan had 
“felt this way after going fully into the matter” indicated “at 
least that our case is not a strong one.” If, in addition to all this, 
one thought of “the suffering of innumerable human beings,” 
then it passed the Prime Minister’s “comprehension how our 
government can act in the way it has done;” and, how could he 
even begin to set right the matter when he did not even know 
“who [was] responsible for this.” Ending on an angry and even 
threatening note, Nehru wanted to know because, “even apart 
from this particular unfortunate incident, it [threw] light on 
the way government departments function[ed].”
I do not fi t into this picture at all and my mind rebels against this 
method of approach … I should like you to inform the people con-
cerned in the ministry how I view this matter and I should like their 
full justifi cation for what they have done.
Two days later, on 5 October 1948, Nehru presided over a 
meeting on the matter. It was attended by Ayyangar, Saksena, 
Sri Prakasa, Vyas and a number of key offi cials. Opening the 
meeting, Nehru emphasised the primary “need for repatriating 
Hindus who were in Pakistan that should be taken into consid-
eration in dealing with the case instead of legalistic grounds.” 
Sri Prakasa explained Pakistan’s point of view of the case, 
while Vyas and the general manager of Jodhpur State Railway 
put forward Jodhpur’s counters. Vyas was not cowed down by 
the Prime Minister’s presence and stated preference, and com-
batively probed whether, in the fi rst place, under the 1924 
agreement there was any obligation on Jodhpur to sell the rail-
way stock to Pakistan. He stated this especially in view of the 
fact that replacing the rolling stock, to be given to Pakistan, 
would cost around `2.5 crore—much more than the book 
 value on which Pakistan was paying for them. 
Transfer of Rolling Stock
Ayyangar sensibly defl ected this by pointing that this was alto-
gether “a new aspect of the case and negotiations had been 
proceeding on the basis of transfer of rolling stock at their 
book value, even before the Government of India came into 
the picture.” A joint committee of Jodhpur and Pakistan offi -
cials had already prepared lists of rolling stock to be trans-
ferred and their value. Vyas then changed his track and raised 
the question of the payment of gratuity to the railway staff 
 affected by this transfer. He wanted Pakistan to agree to this 
payment in principle before he allowed any transfer of rolling 
stock. Once again, Ayyangar sobered him down by reminding 
him that, in August, the Government of India had “separated 
the question into three issues [rolling stock, net earnings and 
gratuity/pension], each [to] be dealt with separately and not 
mixed up.” It was reiterated that the question regarding the 
transfer of rolling stock had to be settled independently of the 
other issues.
To break the deadlock, “it was agreed that the fi rst step 
should be a deposit by Pakistan of an irrevocable credit of `40 
lakh in the Imperial Bank of India, Jodhpur.” Up next was the 
question of checking by Pakistan offi cials of the book value of 
the rolling stock to be transferred to Pakistan. Sri Prakasa 
then asked as to what should be considered as a substantial 
amount of rolling stock to be transferred as the fi rst instal-
ment. It was decided that this “would depend upon the availa-
bility, but every effort would be made to give as much as could 
be made immediately available.” It was further decided that 
Sri Prakasa might, if necessary, agree to the balance of the 
value of rolling stock already detained by Pakistan, that is, `7 
lakh being paid in four equal instalments, each instalment 
with each of the fi rst four deliveries. It was hoped that these 
proposals would allay Pakistan’s apprehensions as regards the 
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delivery of rolling stock to them by the Jodhpur government. 
The vital change in the Indian attitude now from before was 
the provision of  “payment of the price of the stock in cheque 
simultaneous with the delivery of material.” The High Com-
mission in Karachi was directed to assure the Pakistan govern-
ment that “the Government of India will be satisfi ed if pay-
ment is made at the border of Jodhpur simultaneously with the 
delivery of the stock to Pakistan.”
Impact on the Refugee Movement
Even as decks were seemingly being cleared in New Delhi, a 
telegram came from Karachi indicating that the Pakistan 
 government was digging its heels now. On 9 October 1948, the 
Indian High Commission reported that fi rst, the Pakistan gov-
ernment insisted on payment being made only when the train 
crosses into Pakistani territory, that is, the delivery will be 
completed only when the stock crosses the borders. They 
agreed to take charge of the stock at the nearest border station 
on the Jodhpur side. Second, while the Indian side had pro-
posed that the check and valuation of the transferred stock by 
Pakistan authorities was to take place after the irrevocable 
credit was placed with the Imperial Bank of India, Jodhpur, the 
Pakistan government wanted to place the credit on completion 
of the valuation. On the main point, namely, simultaneous de-
livery of stock and payment within Jodhpur territory, as in-
formed to Dutt on 13 October 1948, the Ministry of Railways 
was in no mood to compromise and wanted the Indian High 
Commission to persuade the Pakistan authorities in this  regard. 
The argument of the Pakistan authorities that “it was diffi cult 
for them to take charge of the stock at Jodhpur as their run-
ning staffs was unfamiliar with the track and the operating 
conditions on the Jodhpur Railway” was brushed aside by them. 
On the second point, New Delhi agreed on the sequence of 
valuation to be followed by placing of the irrevocable credit in 
favour of Jodhpur at the Imperial Bank of India. Similarly, the 
Pakistan government wanted to be assured that the fi rst instal-
ment of the locomotives and rolling stock released was at least 
50% of the total number and the delivery would be completed 
in four instalments. New Delhi had no objection, but was 
 unsure whether as much as 50% could be sent with the fi rst 
instalment, given the uncertain availability of stock once the 
valuation was done. Still, it assured Karachi that, as far as pos-
sible, it would try to meet their point. In turn, Karachi agreed 
to  the payment of the balance of the value of the detained 
stock, `7 lakh, in four instalments alongside the fourfold pay-
ment of material under the new arrangements. It all now 
 depended on Karachi agreeing on “the fundamental issue of 
payment at the time of delivery,” with other details being 
 capable of adjustment. It took almost another month, but 
 Karachi did so. On 19 November 1948, Vyas telephoned Mathai 
with the following message for Nehru: 
We have received `40 lakh from Pakistan four days ago in addition to 
`10 lakh which we had already received some months ago as irrevocable 
credit. We are despatching a special train today to Pakistan. In three weeks’ 
time, the handing over of rolling stock to Pakistan will be completed. 
As has been recently argued, “material implications of Parti-
tion, except for the process of border making, have largely 
 escaped scholarly attention” and “the process of dividing assets” 
that led to these implications was managed by a “multifaceted 
bureaucratic apparatus [with] its complications” (Sengupta 
2014: 530–1; also see Chatterji 1999; Schendel 2004; Chester 
2009). From here, though, it is diffi cult to agree with the ac-
companying assertion that this bureaucracy was “surprisingly 
restrained and cooperative towards one another” in perform-
ing this exercise. As was acknowledged by Nehru, they could 
be and were rather immoderate and disobliging. The reality of 
partition did not make them accommodating or amenable. 
When the uncertainty before could not make people willing 
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Notes
1  1947 Archive, http://www.1947 partition-
archive.org/library.
2  The Partition Museum, Amritsar, http://www.
partitionmuseum.org.
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and yielding, why should the certainty after necessarily bend 
and move them? A “common [colonial] statecraft” might have 
been produced in the summer of 1947 in the subcontinent 
(Chatterji 2013), but it was not in service of a common post-
colonial state, but of competing, contrary and calcitrant 
“state-nations.” 
It is also argued that senior politicians and bureaucrats exi sting 
and operating “from a somewhat external position [remained] 
sanitised from the larger social climate of the subcontinent” 
(Sengupta 2014: 540–41). As we saw above, men like Vyas and 
Puri were rather stubborn and tiresome, and to the extent that 
they disappointed Nehru, and were even dis obedient. They can 
hardly be described as Nehruvian elite “dispersed thinly but 
crucially throughout the government,” while being removed 
from the “vernacular everyday discourses” of aggressive na-
tionalism (Manor 1991: 85, 90). This binary between the be-
nevolent higher, elite, sophisticated, cosmopolitan planners 
and the bitter lower, everyman, crude, nationalist execu ters 
is hardly tenable given the vagaries of the subcontinent. 
Finally, they might have been “pragmatic, rational and 
 methodical” (Sengupta 2014: 546–47), but not so as to be forth-
coming, reasonable and mutual; that they were not chaotic in 
their minds does not mean they were compassionate. The 
“process of Partition” certainly had “multiple logics” (Sengupta 
2014: 546–47), but these did not always or automatically lead 
to consensus. At times, consensus was neither desired nor pur-
sued. There were contests, which, while being internally com-
plicated, remained externally uneven clashes between two, in 
this case two and a half, unequal state-nations.
The episode of Jodhpur Railways illuminates the process of 
“Long Partition” (Zamindar 2007). One colonial state appara-
tus, with the lapse of paramountcy, transitioned through a zone 
of tricky tripartite engagement at this time, with each coming 
to terms with the other. The newly acquired technologies of 
modern statecraft in the subcontinent started to overwhelm 
old modes of transactions and persuasions, as personifi ed by 
Sri Prakasa and his style of interventions based on personal 
connections, and by Nehru and his urgings based on humane 
consi derations. Instead, state affi liations started to be steadily 
asce ndant to recreate political institutions and national inter-
ests, and as their gatekeepers, in the world of independent 
 dominions and acceded princely states, the “offi cial mind” 
wielded considerable infl uence over individual intentions, 
even if these were of the Prime Minister’s. As this particular 
case shows, the latter’s power and infl uence were located 
within this matrix of the machinery of modern statehood and 
to that extent limited by its structures, especially during the 
liminal “partitioned times.” 
